Encountering Clayoquot, Reading the Political

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I first arrived in Tofino—the main non-Native village in Clayoquot Sound—for a three-week visit on December 20, 1988. Just getting to Clayoquot Sound was a striking experience: a two-hour ferry ride from Vancouver to Vancouver Island, then a three-hour drive over rugged mountains, with not so much as a house or gas station for the last hour or so. At the end of the road was Tofino: a sleepy, rain-drenched hamlet. I knew little about the politics or history of British Columbia, even less about the precise region I was visiting. I was an American university student on holiday. Nevertheless, I was soon drawn into the politics of the place.

My first encounters were highly encouraging. They made me think of Tocqueville’s descriptions of democracy in early republican New England (Tocqueville 1990, 62–83, 248–53): here in Clayoquot was civic engagement of a kind that I had not encountered while growing up in California’s Central Valley. I went to a meeting sponsored by the Tofino–Long Beach Chamber of Commerce. It was part of the local community’s response to a bitter conflict that past summer over road building and future logging plans in Sulphur Passage, a pristine area in the heart of the Sound. That conflict had not been the first: there had been an even more dramatic controversy over logging on Meares Island in 1984. The village looks out on Meares, where a lovely sugarloaf-shaped mountain seems to rise up from the sea itself. The village’s water is piped over from Meares, so the question of logging there is especially sensitive. In any case, things had evolved to the point at which people were assembling to hear two reports on the region’s future: one from Ric Careless (CD II/B/1) and the other from Robert Prescott-Allen. The reports were impressive: Careless explored the region’s potential as a tourist destination, and Prescott-Allen described how the principles and practices
of sustainable development, expressed in the United Nations' recently published World Commission on Environment and Development Report (Brundtland and the World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), could be applied within the region. What impressed me most were the responses of the audience. Although there was some suspicion about the proposals, participants engaged in a vibrant and engaged conversation about the way a sustainable development planning process might work in Tofino. There was certainly no consensus about priorities—some emphasized the need to limit the clearcut logging of the region, others expressed concerns about the overexpansion of tourism, still others talked about alternative forms of economic development, justice for Native peoples, and so on—but the spirit of the meeting suggested that here was a community with an engaged, proactive vision of its own future.

This impression was reinforced, in my own mind, by the community's response to an oil spill that began washing ashore on New Year's Eve. Within twelve hours the village had mobilized: groups patrolled the miles and miles of beaches after each high tide, collecting bag upon bag of thick, corrosive, tarlike oil; a command center kept track of where oil was washing up, directed people to remote beaches, and organized the pickup of collected oil; local businesses and individuals donated food and organized a "soup kitchen" for volunteers; others set up a facility for cleaning and rehabilitating oil-soaked birds, seeking advice on how to proceed by telephone. The tiny, remote community came to life and seemed to move with one purpose and enormous effectiveness. The number of people participating was very high. Other things in the village came to a halt as everyone focused on removing the oil as quickly as possible: with each high tide the ocean delivered more oil, in smaller chunks more and more difficult to collect. It was not until many days later that the provincial government made an appearance—a few folks in helicopters surveying the scene—and longer still before any government-organized help arrived. Volunteers, however, streamed into the area from Vancouver, Victoria, and beyond to pick up the slack as the locals began to fade from exhaustion.

As I observed these events, it seemed to me that the situation in Clayoquot Sound was both extraordinary and important. The community was seeking to challenge a narrative about its future that seemed inevitable to most observers and many participants: that the Sound would be clearcut logged by large multinational logging corporations (as much of the rest of Vancouver Island had been); that the profits from this logging would flow to the urban headquarters of these corporations; and that the local inhabitants—Nuu-chah-nulth and non-Natives—would be left to carry on
with their local affairs, coping with whatever impacts (positive or negative) the logging had on their livelihoods. This was, after all, the story of British Columbia, and indeed of much of Canada. Given this, images of David and Goliath—or even Don Quixote?—came to mind.

However, the vision and ambition of the community—the energy, commitment, experience, and resources of the people involved—suggested to me that if any community could achieve what they sought, this one should. After all, the region had a lot going for it: a relatively small population, great natural resources, well-established institutions of liberal democracy, and a favored geographic location in relation to both Canada and the United States. If such a community were unable to seize some control over its future, this would be deeply troubling.

I left Clayoquot Sound inspired and intrigued by the place, its peoples, and the challenges they faced. My curiosity brought me back soon after, and since then I have been coming and going from there, alternately living amid its complexities and observing it from far away. It has never ceased to be an engaging, intriguing, and deeply challenging place. The attraction is not difficult to explain: it is a place of spectacular beauty, and my response to it mirrors not only that of most who visit the region, but that of many who have, over the years, arrived for a visit only to stay for a year, a decade, or a lifetime. I was, however, also drawn by the challenge it posed to me as a student and teacher of politics. My observation of and participation in events there has continually reminded me of the complexity, richness, and difficulty of effectively thinking and acting politically. Time and again, Clayoquot, more than anything in my formal studies, made me realize the limitations of how we understand—and teach—politics today.

Although the task the peoples of Clayoquot had chosen was monumental, it also seemed relatively straightforward: to disrupt the inevitability of the narrative that threatened the place they held dear, to assert some control in relation to the landscape surrounding the community, as well as the local economy. What surprised me most about events that followed was not their success—although that in itself was impressive—but two other things: what their success required, and what it revealed. In order to disrupt the narrative about the future of Clayoquot Sound, a whole assumed terrain of politics had to be called into question: the issue was not just whether or how logging should occur, but who should decide. Based on what authority? Democratic? If so, expressing whose will? The local people's? (Which ones?) Provincial voters? International consumers? Perhaps it should be decided on scientific authority? But whose science would be used? Interpreted or practiced by whom? These questions provoked others: Who did
"own" Clayoquot? What was Clayoquot "for"? Should it be put to the "use" of local people? Should its wealth fill provincial coffers? Shareholders' pockets? Nuuchahnulth economies? Ecotourist operators' accounts? Or, indeed, should it be left "pristine," and removed from human economies?

All of these are intensely political—as well as historical, moral, economic, administrative, and ecological—questions. They generated debates not only in Clayoquot Sound, but, as events proceeded, across Canada (CD III/B/4, CD III/C/3, CD III/C/8, CD III/C/11, CD III/D/5-6); in shareholder meetings in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan (CD IV/9, CD VI/7, CD VI/18); in town councils and the European Parliament (CD V/A/3); in courtrooms and international media (CD III/D/1-3, CD II/E/11, CD III/D/8). I would never have predicted the scale, complexity, and intensity of conflicts that lay ahead in the region as I observed members of the community debating possible sustainable developing strategies and picking up oil off beaches in 1988. Nor, I think, did anyone else: ultimately, the disruption of the narrative future of Clayoquot Sound involved not only those in the region, but people at diverse sites around the world.

Some believe the problems I heard about in that meeting in 1988 and that came to a head in 1993 have finally been resolved, thanks to a 1999 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the main contending parties and the agreement that led to the area's designation as a United Nations' Biosphere Reserve in the spring of 2000. The truth is that the most difficult issues in Clayoquot are still unresolved, or have simply been displaced onto other areas.

This has been manifest most obviously in the struggle to create new and possibly different futures in the Sound, a struggle that has proven extremely difficult: slow, uncertain, intensely and sometimes bitterly contested, and exhausting. There is a constant, weary struggle to keep things from slipping "backwards" into familiar narratives, and a much more tenuous and difficult-to-grasp sense of what the alternative might be. Both parts of this equation—the disruption of familiar assumptions and terrains of politics and the struggle to articulate different futures from those we have inherited—pose crucial challenges to all who are interested in politics, whether as students and teachers of politics, as activists, or as citizens. It is in this sense that I see Clayoquot as a microcosm of politics: the particularities of Clayoquot may be unique, but the underlying tensions—the questions and problems at stake there—are not.

That said, there is no way of analyzing these underlying tensions without engaging with the particularities. In this essay, I will introduce readers to events in the region, and to some of these particularities, in much the same way that I was introduced: as an outsider coming from a
foreign country. My account should be checked against other histories of the struggles in and over Clayoquot; some of these histories (most of which are brief and quite readable) are on-line in *The Clayoquot Documents*.

My account proceeds in three parts. The first focuses on the period from 1988 to 1993, when Clayoquot Sound was forced into the public eye, and struggles focused primarily on framing the future of Clayoquot as a political issue. This was a period when, even as the provincial government attempted to contain the conflicts through “sustainable development” processes, the conflicts kept exceeding its efforts. It culminated with the mass protests of the summer of 1993: the period when the region was most prominently in the glare of international media attention. The second section covers the period from 1994 to 1997, which was inaugurated by two new provincial government containment strategies that had the effect of shifting the locus of political conflict out of the public eye. Rather than a time of dramatic protests and arrests, this was a period of the micropolitics of committee meetings about scientific epistemology, management plans, and techniques of implementation, on the one hand, and international markets campaigns, showdowns at shareholder meetings, and secret negotiations, on the other. The third section brings events up to date, exploring the developments that enabled the designation of the region as a United Nations Biosphere Reserve in 2000, and suggesting that the issues at stake in Clayoquot were re-posed, rather than resolved, by the Biosphere Reserve designation. Rather than a resolution, the designation suggests yet another refiguring of the terrain of politics in Clayoquot Sound.

**Politicalizations: First Nations, Sustainable Development, and Community Conflict**

My second visit to Tofino, in January 1991, introduced me to a much more complicated political landscape than I had first encountered. I quickly realized that my earlier sense of a unified community with shared aspirations was only partly accurate. Although there was a shared desire among the local communities for more control over their futures, there were significantly different visions of both what this meant and what it should lead to. During the period leading up to 1993, much of the local political terrain was absorbed by competing efforts to frame what kind of a problem was manifest at Clayoquot, and thus what kind of solution should be applied. Perhaps the most prominent struggle was between local environmentalists, who insisted that clearcut logging was the problem and wished to preserve intact ecosystems, and the provincial government, which believed that environmental protests were the problem and wished to preserve an economy dependent on resource extraction. However, as we will see, this was only
the most obvious, and by no means the most important, struggle over how the issues should be framed, however much it functioned to conceal the much more complex struggles at the local level.

I arrived amid the threat of a boycott against most Tofino businesses organized by the local Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations. For some time, the Nuu-chah-nulth had been running a former residential school site—located on a small beach near town, and bordered by two tourist resorts—as a modest tourist hostel. They had decided to petition the federal government to change the site's official designation to "reserve land," which would give them jurisdiction to develop it into a tourist resort. They had an offer of partnership from the Best Western resort chain, and were hoping to develop an attractive resort that would bring much-needed income and employment to the region's Native peoples. When they requested a letter of support for their application from the Tofino village council, a number of local businesspeople organized a petition of opposition. Their stated concerns were that the development was inappropriate to the site, and that having a "reserve" on the beach would make the beach less attractive to tourists. The Nuu-chah-nulth challenged this position, accusing them of racism and of a desire to eliminate competition for their own businesses. The village council was swayed by the business opposition, though, and refused a letter of support (Harper n.d., 88). The Nuu-chah-nulth responded with the threat to boycott all local businesses. As plans for the boycott proceeded, charges of racism flew fast and furious. The local environmental group, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, organized "antiracism workshops." Non-Native residents argued among themselves about how to respond, with some organizing a counterpetition and others rallying in support of the first petition.

In the years I had been away, the level of politicization and engagement of the region's First Nations had dramatically increased, and this in turn had fundamentally altered the character of regional politics. The change was the result of a number of events. One was the continuing fallout from the first antilogging blockade in the region, in 1984 at Meares Island, where Tofino residents and members of the Clayoquot/Tla-o-qui-aht band of the Nuu-chah-nulth had combined their efforts to prevent logging on the island. The blockade had been temporarily resolved when the Tla-o-qui-aht declared Meares Island a "tribal park" (CD II/A/1) and, in support of this declaration, applied for and received an injunction to halt logging on the island until their outstanding land claims were resolved (CD II/A/2, CD II/D/5). The injunction had given the residents of Tofino some breathing room: their viewscape and the watershed that provided their drinking water would not be logged in the short run.
For the Nuu-chah-nulth, however, this was but the beginning of a long and expensive legal struggle to establish their title to Meares Island. Although some Tofino residents made efforts to raise funds to support this legal action, the brunt of it was (and is) borne by the Nuu-chah-nulth. Simultaneously, a number of other developments significantly raised the profile of Native politics in Canada, including the 1990 confrontation at Oka between Mohawk warriors and the Quebec police (York and Pindera 1991), which spawned sympathetic information blockades in Tofino and elsewhere across Canada (Harper n.d., 88). In addition, a range of legal decisions in British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada effectively strengthened the legal status of Native land claims. These high-profile events combined with the success of the injunction preventing logging on Meares Island to encourage Nuu-chah-nulth leaders to be more assertive in relation to local political issues. However, their experience of being left holding the bag in the Meares case had also made them cautious in their support of environmentalists. It seemed that although the Nuu-chah-nulth might contribute to environmental struggles in the Sound, the consequences of their contributions would fall largely on their own communities. This caution turned to suspicion when local environmentalists were unable to get the Tofino village council to support the Nuu-chah-nulth’s application for a tourist resort. As they attempted to gain more self-sufficiency and continue their legal struggles, the Nuu-chah-nulth not only received little support, they were prevented from participating in the emerging tourist economy by the very people who were benefiting from the Nuu-chah-nulth’s efforts to protect Meares Island. The acrimony that accompanied the boycott made it clear that, although there was considerable support for Native rights among the non-Native population of Tofino, this support did not extend to a majority of the local electorate. The effect of this was the exposure both of important political divides within the non-Native communities of Tofino and of divides between Native and non-Native political interests.

As the Nuu-chah-nulth boycott moved from planning to reality, other tensions began to surface, particularly in relation to the now-ongoing sustainable development processes. The meeting I had observed in 1988 had borne fruit. Following it, the community had put together its own Steering Committee on Sustainable Development, composed of local representatives: a village alderman; a logger; a fisheries technician; the owners of a construction business, a tourist business, a fish processing plant, and a marine supply business; and a member of the Chamber of Commerce. Its work had proceeded apace: community meetings solicited residents’ views on past, present, and possible future economic development for the region.
(CD II/E/10). The level of engagement and agreement was very high. However, once burned by their experience in the earlier Meares Island planning process—in which long hours of work to produce community-approved plans for the future of the island had resulted in the logging company (MacMillan Bloedel) walking away from the table and the provincial government completely ignoring the planning team’s recommendations (CD II/A/2)—the Steering Committee feared its efforts would be in vain unless it could solicit government sanction for and participation in the process. This led it to approach the government in August 1989 with a report on the Committee’s work to date and a request for government support for a more extensive sustainable development process (CD II/C/1). Some residents would later argue that this relinquishing of local authority was a significant strategic error, as it formally extended the conflict beyond the locale of Tofino.

The provincial government agreed to support such a project, but also asserted control over it, significantly expanding both the representation on the negotiating team and the terms of reference for the process. Although still organized on a consensus model, the new process (called the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force) was based on sectoral representation and included representatives from a much broader regional and resource perspective. The new process included three representatives from Tofino, but also representatives from Port Alberni, Ucluelet, and the Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District, from the two logging companies with interests in Clayoquot (Fletcher Challenge, Canada and MacMillan Bloedel), from the IWA, Ministries of Environment and Regional Development, and the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council. Not surprisingly, the broader representation introduced new levels of difficulty into the process.

In particular, the new Task Force quickly ground to a halt over the contentious issue of whether and where logging should be allowed to proceed while the Task Force’s work was ongoing. Environmentalists became concerned that the process had been turned into a “talk and log” process—a way to keep environmentalists and local residents busy while logging proceeded apace. They sought a good-faith commitment from logging and government interests to at least reduce, if not halt, logging while the process continued. They argued that the government should encourage diversification of the economy by providing job retraining for any loggers whose jobs might be affected by a reduction in logging. However, with other members of the process firmly committed to representing the interests of their sector, no one had any impetus to give ground on the issue, and the process quickly stalled (CD II/D/4; CD II/D/5). The response of the government was
to reorganize the process for a second time into the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee (CSSDSSC), implementing some changes in the structure and terms of reference, expanding the representation on the board yet again, and, more important, relieving the committee of the responsibility for deciding on short-term logging plans. These decisions it referred to the BC Cabinet in hopes that relieving the committee of this responsibility would enable it to focus on longer-term issues.

The new CSSDSSC cautiously began work, and everyone anxiously awaited the Cabinet's decision on short-term logging, believing that it would be the crucial indication of whether the government would support any changes to "business as usual." The caution was also an effect of the toll these processes were beginning to take on the lives of those involved. The Task Force had dragged on for six months, and some local participants were beginning to resent the impact the endless meetings had on their lives, not least as the representatives of some sectors were paid employees of the industries whose interests were at stake, whereas locals were generally participating while also trying to maintain their businesses, families, employment, and so on. When the Cabinet's decision on interim logging came down, the environmentalists felt their fears were confirmed: the rate of cut in the region showed little change, and the Cabinet sanctioned logging in a watershed that the environmentalists considered pristine (CD II/E/2). In the end, the two environment representatives chose to withdraw from the process in protest (CD II/E/3). One of the tourism representatives, concerned about the apparent failure of the government to commit to a diversification of the economy of the region, also resigned (CD II/E/4). The government announced that despite the rupture of the consensus-based process, it would continue without the participation of those sectors whose representatives had resigned. The environmentalists geared up to do everything they could to discredit the process: the truce was over and the battle over logging, on hold since 1988, began anew.

Signs of the battle quickly appeared. Soon after the provincial government's decision to permit new logging, and in the same week as the Nuu-chah-nulth boycott of Tofino businesses began, a logging bridge was burned beyond repair in an act of sabotage. MacMillan Bloedel responded by driving logging machinery into Tofino in the early hours one morning and loading it onto a barge to be transported to the logging site. With the reporter from the local paper snapping photos, the barge began its journey across the harbor only to hit a rock and dump its cargo overboard (Harper, n.d., 96). Environmentalists were gleeful, but the anger and frustration in the air was palpable. Not only was the town of Tofino internally divided, but the
Nuu-chah-nulth communities were still angry at Tofino’s refusal to support their economic diversification efforts, and both Ucluelet and Port Alberni—the two closest non-Native towns—rallied in support of the logging industry and rained criticism on the “cappuccino-sucking urban environmentalists” who had “invaded” Tofino. Over the next few months, the environmentalists turned their attention to plans for direct action and the building of international coalitions to support their efforts. Meanwhile, the CSSDSSC continued and the Nuu-chah-nulth boycott, though eventually resolved (ibid., 108), left lasting resentment and suspicion in the communities. Rising tensions were reflected in acts of vandalism, shouting matches in parking lots, and a sense of anxiety as people further committed to hardened positions (ibid., 89, 96, 105–6).

I got a rather different perspective on what was at stake in conflicts over the Sound when, toward the end of the summer of 1991, I volunteered to help a well-known local whale researcher, Dr. James Darling, with a new project he was undertaking. He had been commissioned by the Hesquiat, the Nuu-chah-nulth band whose territory covers the northernmost reaches of the Sound, to do an inventory of the condition of all the resources they had traditionally harvested from their territory. This project involved first combing through oral histories that had been collected from Hesquiat elders by anthropologists in the 1950s, looking for references to resources they had traditionally harvested from their environment, and where and how the resources were collected. We then mapped the locations of all of these resources, and headed out to locate them and evaluate their current condition.

It was a fascinating project. The first thing that struck me was the sheer number of species the Hesquiat had used from their environments. Whereas their forests were now being devastated (the Hesquiat’s territory has been heavily impacted by clearcut logging) for two or three species of tree, in the past they had harvested dozens of different species from the forests, many more from the marine environments (Turner and Efrat 1982). In addition to the obvious ones—salmon, herring, seal, shellfish—were many others, including grasses, herbs, seaweed, cedar bark, berries of all kinds, sea creatures I had never heard of, and whales.

The precision, specificity, and accuracy of the information we were working from was amazing. In some cases, a particular species would be harvested during only one week of the year, with its condition being carefully monitored to determine the precise timing. In other cases, a resource would only be located in one specific and remote place that could only be reached with difficulty and might only be visited once a year—hence the
necessity of knowing precisely when the resource would be ready for harvest. Some of the resources were quite easy to locate and verify, but on many days we would set out on what appeared to be a wild-goose chase. One day we were in search of high-bush cranberries (a plant none of us had ever positively identified before). In pouring rain, we followed what seemed to be impossibly vague instructions: walk up a riverbed for about fifteen minutes, then turn left and walk through the forest for another ten minutes and there we would find the patch of high-bush cranberries that the Hesquiaht harvested once a year. Walking up the river in the pouring rain was no easy task, and walking through the forest was nearly impossible. We were convinced we were about to become hopelessly lost (we were without our Hesquiaht guide that day), but it was beautiful and remote and we had the feeling of being the first to see each change in the light and scenery, so we continued. We reached where we thought we were supposed to be, laughing at the impossibility of finding our way back, let alone anything resembling a cranberry bush. And there we spotted what was clearly a patch of high-bush cranberries, perfectly matching our guidebook description. We shook our heads in amazement, convinced the plants must be everywhere and now we would be able to identify them on our way back to the boat. But we did not see another one in the rest of our week of tramping up and down rivers. Again and again the information contained in the reports would be astonishingly accurate, leading us to species and regions we had not known existed.

I had to leave long before the study was completed, but I had gained a very different view of the "wilderness" of Clayoquot Sound, and a deep respect for the way that it was known, cultivated, and supported by the Nuu-chah-nulth. The experience also affected Darling, who went on to join with other locals to form a new organization, the Clayoquot Biosphere Project (CBP), a project in part geared toward developing scientifically rigorous data similar to and compatible with the traditional knowledge of the Nuu-chah-nulth (Greer 1997, 23–24).

By the time I returned to Clayoquot Sound in the summer of 1992, the Clayoquot Biosphere Project was hard at work. Its formal mission was to be a nonprofit research and education organization, committed to pursuing and facilitating research into intact temperate rainforest ecosystems. The creation of the organization was partly motivated by the belief that to the extent that decisions about the future of the region were being made on scientific grounds, they were being made in the absence of adequate scientific data about the precise ecosystems affected. The existing scientific data often consisted either of studies done on other kinds of forest ecosystems or of
short-term studies, as opposed to the kind of long-term, precise data that emerge from careful observation across seasons and years, such as the traditional knowledge of the Nuu-chah-nulth. The CBP was also, however, motivated by a desire to develop community-based research that engaged and was responsible to local communities. Its aspiration was to create a research center similar to the one at Woods Hole, Massachusetts (Ecotrust Canada and Gill 1997, 76), one that would not only bring world-class researchers to the area, but would provide education, training, and opportunities for local researchers, especially First Nations, and would contribute to the diversification of the local economy by guaranteeing its status as a prime destination for major research projects on intact temperate rainforest ecosystems. It was also hoped that the government might hesitate before granting a logging permit for an area that was involved in an extensive research project that could not be replicated elsewhere.

The Clayoquot Biosphere Project was only one example of an explosion of political activities as all participants in the Clayoquot struggles sought to establish claims to what mattered most about the region. Various environmental organizations were by then conducting a range of campaigns. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound rallied local support for direct action, and lobbied international environmental organizations to take up the cause of temperate rainforest protection. The Western Canada Wilderness Committee (www.wildernesscommittee.org) began building a trail into a pristine area to encourage visitors to view the threatened ecosystem for themselves. Ecotrust (www.ecotrust.org) brought international journalists to the region, encouraging them to compare the struggles in the region with struggles to preserve tropical rainforests in Central and South America in hopes of shaming the BC government into better forestry practices (CD II/E/11, CD III/D/5–6). All sought to focus a maximum of national and international media attention on the region. Reporters and film crews working in German or Japanese became a not-uncommon sight. In response, logging companies joined together to form a new public-relations organization—the Forest Alliance (www.forest.org)—and the government of British Columbia dramatically expanded its international public-relations work on forestry issues (Doyle, Elliott, and Tindall 1997). In Ucluelet, an industry-sponsored community-based “Share” group, on the model of the Wise Use movement in the United States, gained strength, expressing concern about the future of logging jobs and local economies and rallying support for logging interests at a community level (CD II/D/2, CD V/11). The CSSDSSC, meanwhile, rambled on toward its conclusion.
All of this happened in the context of massive transformations in the local economies. Each year, commensurate with the media attention focused on the region, tourism grew by leaps and bounds. New hotels, restaurants, cafés, bed-and-breakfasts, whale-watching and nature tour companies appeared, seemingly overnight. Local "information centers" attempted to educate tourists either to the viability or to the tragedy of clearcut logging in Clayoquot Sound. This changing local economy had the effect of disrupting the daily lives and patterns of residents who had lived in Tofino for generations: complaints abounded about long lines at the grocery store, nowhere to park, crowded beaches, local hangouts overrun by strangers, and the frantic pace of life as everyone (else) struggled to cash in on the new economy. Fear of the alternative—being squeezed out by the new economy as house prices and property taxes skyrocketed, rental housing became unavailable as every extra room was converted to a bed-and-breakfast, or the town simply became uninhabitable—also haunted conversations. Often the blame for these changes—and the resulting alienation of the community—was laid at the feet of the environmentalists who seemed intent on directing endless attention to the region. Many people wondered if their contributions to struggles to halt clearcut logging would have the effect of saving the region from one evil only to have it overrun and destroyed by another.

The summer came to a close with the Friends of Clayoquot Sound blockading a logging road, shadowed by an increasingly aggressive contingent of pro-logging "Share" supporters. Interactions between the two groups were heated. The blockade resulted in sixty-five arrests (CD V2, 370), and the Friends of Clayoquot Sound promised that this was only the beginning. They were right, as it turned out.

When I returned for the summer of 1993, it was to swirling discontent. Environmentalists were vowing that it would be the summer of a thousand arrests, though no one—not even them—was sure this was anything more than brave talk. There were enough indications to create a stir, though: the international efforts of the FOCS were beginning to pay off, with the creation of a new globally oriented network for the conservation of Clayoquot Sound and with increasing interest in Clayoquot by some heavyweight international environmental organizations such as Greenpeace (CD III/A/1; CD III/C/2; CD III/C/11, V1, 252). The European Rainforest Movement had presented a letter endorsed by twenty environmental organizations to the Canadian embassy stating that it would be advising consumers not to purchase wood products from Clayoquot Sound (CD V2, 371). Preparations for
blockades and posturing for media attention reached a fever pitch, with the planned “kickoff” on July 1: Canada Day. There was a collective holding of breath, with the government and the logging industry hoping the environmentalists were bluffing, and the environmentalists hoping they were not.

The events of the previous several months had ratcheted up the conflict considerably. In the previous fall, the CSSDSSC had come to its final awkward conclusion: after a failure to reach consensus, it forwarded a few “majority options,” strongly criticized not only by some of its members—especially representatives of mining and tourism interests—but by many other parties as well (CD II/E/12; CD V.2, 371). The matter was turned over to the provincial government. The government had changed in the fall of 1991, when the social-democratic New Democratic Party (NDP), out of office since 1975, had returned to power. The NDP had support from the forestry workers’ unions, but also from aboriginals and environmentalists. It had promised to bring an end to the “War in the Woods,” and had to this point seemed open to environmentalists’ concerns. Early in its tenure, the new government had announced a plan to commence a series of extensive roundtable discussions—the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE)—across Vancouver Island (although excluding Clayoquot Sound, because of the ongoing CSSDSSC) on the development of future land-use plans, and committed itself to creating further protected areas (CD III/D/2; Wilson 1998). Both won praise from environmentalists.

The new year brought two developments that tempered such praise. First, the NDP purchased a large block of shares in MacMillan Bloedel, the logging company with the largest interest in Clayoquot Sound, thus becoming for a time the largest single known shareholder (CD III/C/B; CD V.2, 371). Second, in a dramatic announcement on a hill overlooking Clayoquot Sound, the government presented its “solution” to the Clayoquot problem: the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (CLUD) (British Columbia 1993; CD III/B/5). Billed as a “compromise solution,” the decision predictably pleased virtually no one, though the logging companies and Share groups quickly rallied to support it. For the environmentalists, however, it became the lightning rod for their campaigns.

Although the decision increased the protected spaces in the Sound, much of the new protected area was either shoreline or bog forest, with many of the pristine watersheds, mountain viewscapes, and rare ecosystems left unprotected (Sierra Club of Western Canada 1993). Although some other parts of the Sound were designated “special management areas,” there was no indication of the conditions under which they might, or might not, be logged. Worst of all for the government, the NDP’s purchase of
MacMillan Bloedel shares gave the appearance of a conflict of interest, with the government having little motivation to protect the region (Seaton 1993). By now the profile of the region was such that environmentalists could easily make the argument that this treatment was not good enough for Clayoquot Sound: as the largest remaining relatively intact temperate rain-forest ecosystem on Vancouver Island, it was simply too special and too rare to risk its ecological integrity. This argument played very well, especially in Europe, where populations were not reliant on the forest industry for their economic well-being and where the idea of such wilderness is especially appealing.

Resistance to the CLUD was further strengthened by the response of the Nuu-chah-nulth, who complained that the government had once again made unilateral decisions about huge tracts of land that were subject to unresolved land claims without consulting them. Their complaints were later upheld by the ombudsman for British Columbia (McCallum 1993; CD III/C/9; CDV.2, 380), triggering a series of developments that would prove to be crucial. The objections of the Nuu-chah-nulth were especially embarrassing to the NDP because they followed upon the NDP’s commitment to commence a massive effort to negotiate modern treaties with the province’s First Nations (CDV.2, 377), most of whom had never signed treaties and thus still had claims to most of the province’s land base (Tennant 1990; Fisher 1992). This combination of Nuu-chah-nulth and environmentalist criticism, combined with the appearance of a potential conflict of interest on the part of the provincial government, rendered the CLUD a huge liability, exacerbating the problem of Clayoquot Sound for the NDP. It was a liability not least among portions of the party’s own membership: many longtime NDP supporters tore up their membership cards in protest over the decision. Despite an enormous public-relations campaign—including mailings in support of the decision to every house in British Columbia (CD III/B/5) and trips by government (including the premier) and industry spokespeople to Europe and the United States—the decision became the catalyst for the explosion of protest that characterized the summer of 1993.

July 1 saw demonstrations against the CLUD at Canadian embassies and high commissions in England, Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States. No logging roads in Clayoquot Sound were blockaded by environmentalists, however, as they faced a counterblockade organized by Share supporters hoping to keep them out of the woods. This standoff lasted a few days before the protesters were able to stage their first blockade, complete with a Canadian Member of Parliament (Svend Robinson) and a Member of the European Parliament (Paul Staes). Although there were no arrests
(Svend Robinson would be charged one year later and sentenced to fourteen days in jail) (CD V.2, 372), there was keen media coverage, much of it casting a skeptical eye on the number of blockaders and predicting a fizzle in environmentalist support. The next few days’ blockades passed similarly, with crowds of between fifty and one hundred people and an average of eight to ten arrests each day. The blockades were very carefully choreographed; they were peaceful and well organized, designed to attract support rather than to actually prevent logging from happening. Each day the protesters would stand on the road in the predawn; forestry workers would arrive and the injunction ordering the protesters off the road would be read (CD III/C/1); those who did not wish to be arrested would move off the road and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would arrest those who remained. The logging trucks would drive through and the event would be over for the day. This structure was in some contrast to earlier blockades, where smaller numbers of supporters had pulled stunts—locking their arms together with bike locks inside cement-filled barrels, suspending themselves on the end of logs carefully positioned to block the road such that if moved the protesters would be dropped into the river below, and so on—designed to slow down the loggers for much longer periods of time. But the strategy had changed: the emphasis now was on attracting the broadest possible support, and thus the blockades were as orderly, peaceful, and predictable as possible, encouraging even the timid to join the protest. Often the Share-organized counterprotests were much noisier, angrier, and more chaotic.

The strategy worked. Even as media attention began to fade, the number of protesters began to grow. The face of the protest began to change as the participants became more diverse in age, appearance, and occupation. Slowly, incredibly, day by day the momentum of the blockades built, defying the jaded eye of the skeptics. Each day, word of the number of arrests would fly from mouth to mouth over morning coffee in Tofino, and the feeling of amazement grew. Each evening, a few people would gather briefly at the Friends of Clayoquot Sound office to view the evening news and see what the world was watching.

Special “theme days” were organized: forestry workers, elders, farmers, deaf persons, women and children, clergy, and businesspeople each had their day of protest. Celebrities began to appear in Clayoquot, drawing yet more attention. Cover stories appeared in Maclean’s (CD III/C/11), the Globe and Mail (CD III/B/4), the San Francisco Chronicle (CD III/C/7), and other international media.¹⁸ In a carefully staged visit, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and representatives from his organization, the Natural Resources Defense Council (www.nrdc.org), came to pledge support for the Nuu-chah-nulth in
their struggles for justice. Kennedy was given an honorable welcome, carried ashore in a traditional carved canoe, given masks and artwork, and a new relationship was formally cemented. Well known for the assistance his organization had offered the James Bay Cree in their fight against the Great Whale Hydro project, his visit attracted significant media attention (CD III/D/8; CD III/C/11). On July 15, amid much fanfare, the rock band Midnight Oil arrived to give a free concert in support of the protesters. The Nuu-chah-nulth at the last minute requested that the concert not take place at the site of the protest, so the concert was moved to “the Black Hole,” the large clear-cut that was the site of the protesters’ “Peace Camp.” A crowd of more than five thousand showed up, logging was stopped for the day, and the concert was broadcast live on MTV and its Canadian counterpart, MuchMusic. The international profile of Clayoquot Sound continued to grow.

As the arrest toll mounted daily, the momentum appeared unstoppable. For those who supported the protesters, it was an exhilarating time: surely now, finally, the government would see that it had to change its approach. Although most of the faces on the blockade and the vast majority of those arrested were strangers to Tofino residents, there was a strong core of support for the blockade in town. Local businesspeople quietly donated supplies to the Peace Camp, helped with logistics, and visited from time to time. When the camp was blown down by a large storm, many town residents opened their doors to shelter more than ninety protesters until the camp was rebuilt—no small feat for a town of only a thousand in the midst of its busy tourist season. The support for the protest was low-key, however, as the public face of the town was focused on accommodating the swarm of summer visitors.

The Peace Camp, located twenty-five minutes from town by car, developed into its own thriving community. Governed according to nonviolent, ecofeminist principles, the entire community met each evening to plan the next day’s activities, still operating by consensus despite the large numbers of people involved. The camp was not without conflict, of course, but there was a genuinely engaged spirit as people arrived each day and were immediately granted a place in the self-government of the group. Many protesters later said that the experience of the camp had a much more lasting effect on them than the actual arrest experience (CD III/C/2-4; CD III/D/7; McLaren 1994). Often bombarded from the outside by angry pro-logging supporters, the camp banded together and maintained an energy of its own, silently supported by, but very separate from, the bustling tourist town of Tofino.

The protests had by now reached a scale where their daily nuances
became news: charges for arrestees were changed from "civil" to "criminal" contempt of court; buses of "Victoria businesspeople supporting Clayoquot" en route to the blockade were themselves blockaded by logging trucks as they tried to drive through Port Alberni in the predawn; two separate "mass arrest" days resulted in 309 and 242 arrests, respectively, and successfully halted logging for one day each; the first arrestees were sentenced to what seemed to many to be excessively long jail terms; blockade leaders were arrested and charged with "aiding and abetting" criminal activity (they were quickly released, as the RCMP feared they would lose control over the protests without the leaders). The latter two events had particularly strong reverberations across Canada, as prominent lawyers, judges, and activists expressed concern about the apparent suppression of the democratic right of protest. This prompted debate about the appropriateness of civil disobedience and the treatment of the protesters (CD II/D/1–3). By the end of August, the arrest toll was more than eight hundred, and public opinion polls suggested strong opposition across British Columbia to logging Clayoquot Sound; nevertheless, the government remained silent. Environmental leaders began to express puzzlement about how the government could sustain its position under the weight of criticism it was receiving.

With fall approaching, the government's strategy emerged: with a two-pronged effort, it sought to pull the rug of legitimacy out from under the protesters' feet. First, it announced that the Nuu-chah-nulth would be one of the first First Nations to begin treaty negotiations with the provincial government. As part of this process—and partly as a way to mollify Nuu-chah-nulth leaders in the wake of the ombudsman's decision in their favor on their CLUD complaint—the government and the Nuu-chah-nulth negotiated an Interim Measures Agreement (IMA) that gave the Nuu-chah-nulth significant control over the management of resources in Clayoquot Sound during the treaty negotiation process (CD IV/3). By apparently transferring authority away from itself in this way, the government reorganized the strategic terrain for environmentalists. Now the environmentalists could not necessarily use the treatment of First Nations as a justification for their own activities, and they would potentially have to confront First Nations if the latter chose to approve logging plans in areas the protesters sought to protect. By apparently bringing the Nuu-chah-nulth "onside," the government sought both to increase its own legitimacy and to drive a wedge into the tenuous relationship between environmentalists and First Nations. It was a classic "divide-and-conquer" strategy, but its effects reverberated far beyond such strategic motives.
The second key element of the government strategy was the announcement of a "Scientific Panel for Clayoquot Sound" (CD III/C/14; CD III/C/15; CD IV/2). This panel, to be composed of "world-class" specialists, was to survey all available scientific information about the temperate rainforest ecosystems of Clayoquot Sound and come up with the most scientifically rigorous standards anywhere for environmentally sustainable logging in the Sound. In other words, scientific authority was being harnessed to stitch together the now yawning gap in political authority of the provincial government.

This two-pronged strategy—designed to give the provincial government some leverage to increase its international legitimacy, now badly damaged both by the summer of arrests and by the more sustained international campaigns—received significant attention from media, not least because the government promoted it heavily in an international media campaign. Environmental groups reacted very cautiously to both aspects, saying all would depend on the specific results each produced. Almost everyone else retreated, exhausted, to recover from a long, difficult summer. The exception was the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, who worked to create support networks for the hundreds of arrestees who continued to face trial.

Even as the protests wound down, and the new government strategy began to unfold, all parties seemed to pause and take stock of the situation. The environmentalists had succeeded beyond their hopes: the extent of support for a change of policy toward Clayoquot had been more loudly proclaimed than they had hoped. However, they had not achieved anything concrete: not one tree in Clayoquot Sound was protected from logging. A new strategy was necessary. The provincial government, bruised and battered, having repeatedly failed in its containment strategies, could only hope that its more recent efforts would be more effective. For the Nuu-chah-nulth, the situation looked brighter than ever before: their claims had at least been recognized; they had been given control over some resource management decision making in the short run, and would be one of the first Native groups to enter treaty negotiations with the provincial and federal governments. How this might translate into longer-term political gains remained uncertain, however. Local residents of Tofino and Ucluelet were perhaps the most stunned. In a few short years, their sleepy, resource-extraction-dependent communities had been transformed: not only splashed across media in faraway places, but increasingly invaded by visitors from those places. Some felt their livelihoods increasingly threatened, and others began to cash in on the new economy, but all shared a
sense that their region's future had been taken out of their control, however much they disagreed about who was to blame. The early enthusiasm for a sustainable development process as a means of achieving local control and authority seemed very distant indeed.

Mediations: The Micropolitics of Scientific Authority, Community Control, and International Markets

Over the winter of 1993–94, the mass trials of protesters kept the Clayoquot spectacle in the public consciousness, even as it moved away from the Sound to the law courts in Victoria. With few precedents to guide them, judges were forced to tread new legal ground in dealing with the protesters. In order not to "clog" the courts, the decision was made to try the protesters in large groups. However, the logistics proved virtually impossible, with the result that many protesters and legal observers argued that some arrestees had been denied basic legal rights (CD III/71/1–3; CD III/7/1; MacIsaac and Champagne 1994). Sentences were drastically inconsistent. The courts were accused of pandering to the NDP, and the bad publicity for the provincial government continued. In a particularly ill-advised move, the Crown maintained aiding and abetting charges against Tzeporah Berman, one of the protest leaders, for more than a year, inciting outrage and inspiring a high-profile campaign against the government for suppressing democratic rights (CD III/C/10).

In the early spring, a pro-logging demonstration at the legislature in Victoria reminded the province that the issues raised the previous summer remained unresolved. In what was billed as the largest political gathering ever at the legislature, fifteen to twenty thousand loggers, their families, and supporters descended on the capital in vehement opposition to the NDP’s CORE process, which had just tabled a recommendation that the annual allowable cut of timber on Vancouver Island should be reduced (CD IV/6). Although the demonstration was not directly in response to Clayoquot, the choice of tactics was in part a response to the previous summer’s protests, as were the anger and fear at the prospects for the logging industry in British Columbia. Although it lasted only one day, the demonstration was a stern reminder of the vise the NDP was in: many of those who had traveled to Victoria to display their displeasure with the government’s policies had also voted for the NDP in the previous election.

Although these two events extended the memory of the previous summer’s protests, by the spring of 1994 the political terrain of the struggle over Clayoquot Sound had fundamentally shifted. There would be no return to
the mass protests of 1993. On the contrary, events early in 1994 signaled a very different character and locus for Clayoquot politics.

In the same month as the pro-logging demonstration, there was a less visible, but equally powerful, development in environmentalists' international campaigns, now coordinated by groups such as Greenpeace (www.greenpeace.org) and Rainforest Action Network (www.ran.org). Over the previous year, the international campaigns had become increasingly focused on pressuring companies that purchased large volumes of forest products to cancel contracts with the companies that harvested in Clayoquot Sound. The environmentalists claimed a significant victory when two large companies from the United Kingdom—Scott Paper and Kimberly-Clark—both canceled pulp contracts with MacMillan Bloedel after Greenpeace and other international environmental organizations threatened them with a consumer boycott. Although each of the contracts was for less than 2 percent of MacMillan Bloedel's total sales, the cancellations caused the companies considerable concern, as they feared a "snowball effect." Partly as a result of the cancellations, MacMillan Bloedel, the Nuu-chah-nulth, and Greenpeace began informal, private communications in search of common ground that might lead to a truce. These talks were secretive, but in the long run would have important implications for the way events unfolded in Clayoquot (CD IV/8).

Other key developments that spring involved the evolution of the two processes the provincial government had set in motion the previous fall: the Interim Measures Agreement with the Nuu-chah-nulth and the Scientific Panel. Soon after its creation, the Panel underwent a transformation that would have a profound impact on its work. Some of the new appointees to the panel joined forces with the Nuu-chah-nulth to insist—based on the newly negotiated Interim Measures Agreement—not only that Nuu-chah-nulth have representation on the Panel, but that their traditional knowledge systems be given equal weight with Western scientific findings in determining appropriate resource extraction techniques in Clayoquot Sound. Although not much was said about this development at the time, the potential impact began to emerge with the release of the first two of five Scientific Panel reports (Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forestry Practices in Clayoquot Sound 1994a, 1994b), in February and May of 1994, each of which strongly emphasized not only the contributions of the First Nations members to the structure, organization, and functioning of the Panel, but also the necessity of including First Nations' traditional knowledge in any future management of logging in Clayoquot Sound. Environmentalists—
realizing again how necessary it was that they improve their relations with the Nuu-chah-nulth—reacted cautiously to these developments and awaited the remainder of the reports. The Panel continued its work, largely behind closed doors, throughout the summer.

The other process was the implementation of the Interim Measures Agreement. In early summer, the government and Nuu-chah-nulth announced the mechanism through which the Nuu-chah-nulth would be able to oversee resource development while the treaty process was ongoing: the Central Region Board (www.island.net/~tofino/ncrb.htm). The Central Region Board was to be composed of half Nuu-chah-nulth representatives and half non-Native representatives (CD VI/2). The Board would be able to approve or reject all resource-management decisions in the region, with a double majority required for any plan to proceed. Its mandate, however, was even broader than that:

the mission of the CRB is to manage lands and resources in Clayoquot Sound, prior to the conclusion of a treaty, in a manner that: provides opportunities for First Nations consistent with aboriginal resource uses and heritage, and considers options for treaty settlement; conserves resources in Clayoquot Sound and promotes resource use that supports sustainability, economic diversification and ecological integrity; [and] encourages dialogue within and between communities and reconciles diverse interests. (CD VI/2)

The new Board was greeted positively in the region, especially because all but one of the newly appointed non-Native Board members were local residents. The apparent shift to more localized control over resource use and management was seen as a promising development. After the announcement, however, the Board slipped from view as the members began to meet, behind closed doors, to establish a working protocol and a strategy for tackling their broad mandate.

Simultaneously, the Nuu-chah-nulth and the provincial and federal governments embarked on the extended and complex process of negotiating a modern-day treaty. It was in this forum—rather than in the shorter-term Interim Measures Agreement—that the Nuu-chah-nulth placed their hopes, and it was to consume enormous energy and resources over subsequent years. Although open to the public, and holding great potential for shaping the future of Clayoquot Sound, these negotiations were not well attended by non-Native residents.

Although many crucial negotiations about the future of Clayoquot were under way, their venue had shifted: the logging road and the inter-
national media were no longer the primary battlegrounds. Rather, future possibilities and necessities were hammered out in meetings of the new Central Region Board and the Scientific Panel, treaty talks between the Nuu-chah-nulth and the provincial and federal governments, and private discussions between the Nuu-chah-nulth, MacMillan Bloedel, and the environmental groups. Most of this activity was distant from the public eye. Even the international campaigning (the environmentalists’ markets campaign and industry and government public-relations campaigns) was increasingly happening as much behind closed doors—in shareholder meetings, private communications, and the like—as in public venues. Although there were still frequent newspaper advertisements and demonstrations at corporate headquarters, these usually took place far from Clayoquot Sound.

In the town of Tofino, it was tourism business as usual; the town was politically quiet, with many people still struggling to respond to the ongoing social and economic changes, or recovering from the long-term effects of their political activities. The future of the region was not at the forefront of people’s minds—a relief to many. In nearby Ucluelet, the future was more on people’s minds: with MacMillan Bloedel’s logging operations in the region virtually at a standstill owing to the blockades and the Scientific Panel, many of its employees were temporarily—perhaps permanently—laid off. Individuals and families struggled to figure out what they would do next.

Although the demonstrations and arrests in 1993 were made in the name of democracy, the changes that resulted actually rendered processes in Clayoquot much less democratic. Meetings about the future of Clayoquot Sound took place behind closed doors, and the most important meetings—between the Nuu-chah-nulth, environmental groups, and MacMillan Bloedel, which led to the “truce” that enabled government-sponsored processes to function—excluded the elected government entirely. The government, it became increasingly clear, had little or no capacity to resolve the issues at stake in the crisis, in part because of its dependence on discourses of legitimacy over which it had little or no control. Thus, the actors with the capacity to bring “peace” to Clayoquot also had no democratic accountability reducible to modern theories of democracy. Clearly, this was a situation that exceeded any categorical assertion or theorization of sovereignty as well.

Further, as these processes continued, it became increasingly clear that the ecological future of the region would hinge in part on highly technical “scientific” decisions. These were decisions that no one, however, could pretend were anything other than political, thanks not least to the inclusion of traditional ecological knowledge in Scientific Panel recommendations, and to the institution responsible for implementing them, the
Central Region Board. The most political site in Clayoquot Sound became the struggle over the interpretation of Scientific Panel recommendations, as local organizations realized. The Clayoquot Biosphere Project responded by sponsoring a number of “Community Science Workshops” in an effort to engage locals and researchers in a critical dialogue about the implications of the Scientific Panel’s recommendations. The FOCS also shifted its efforts to the micropolitics of scientific authority, in part by expanding its “Forest Watch” program, designed to ensure that actual logging practices matched the expectations set out in logging plans. The FOCS appeared before the Central Region Board each time logging plans were submitted, struggling to ensure that the Scientific Panel’s recommendations were interpreted and enforced as rigorously as possible. Who would be hired to do pre-logging wildlife inventories? What methodologies would they use? Would they do time-depth research, or onetime scans? Would traditional ecological knowledge be incorporated? Would violations of logging plans be prosecuted? These were the key questions for the future of each of the watersheds—and, by extension, the future economy—of Clayoquot Sound. Ecotrust Canada responded by mapping the recommendations of the Panel using Geographical Information System (GIS) technology, again in an effort to assert a particular interpretation (Ecotrust Canada and Gill 1997, 36–55). Companies that wished to log in the region also jumped into the fray, submitting a variety of plans based on different interpretations of the Scientific Panel’s recommendations to the Central Region Board. Meanwhile, the Board—the body formally responsible for interpreting the recommendations—struggled to formulate an approach that did justice to the complex interplay of interests and the interweaving of Native and non-Native scientific evidence. Discourses of democracy slipped further and further from the sites of politics as questions of interpretation, culture, time, economy, knowledge, value, and expertise assumed centrality.

As these processes trundled along, the region temporarily closed to logging. At the same time, the fishing industry began to come under strain from a variety of sources: not only were wild stocks in decline, but their status was further threatened by the failure of the United States and Canada to agree on how they should be managed. In addition, the increasingly important fish-farming industry was criticized on environmental grounds, throwing provincial aquaculture policy into question (Ellis and David Suzuki Foundation 1996). Although tourism continued to grow, it became clear that some kind of economic transition strategy was necessary. The region managed to band together to request such a strategy, but the resulting
government-sponsored process revealed what everyone already knew: no one had a clue exactly how to proceed.

Clayoquot Sound was not much in the public eye between 1994 and 1997, but this was not because the difficulties that had earlier plagued the region had been resolved. On the contrary, in many ways the region was under greater pressure than ever. Its future, however, was being negotiated away from the glare of publicity, in highly technical and complex negotiations, usually behind the closed doors of committee meetings. The spaces and character of politics had changed drastically from the logging road conflicts of a few years earlier.

**Resolutions and Nonsolutions: The Biosphere Reserve and Beyond**

Over the next few years, the conflicts over the future of Clayoquot Sound slipped so far from public view that many Canadians were surprised when, on May 5, 2000, at a small ceremony in Pacific Rim National Park, Clayoquot Sound was officially declared a United Nations Biosphere Reserve. The next day's *Globe and Mail* contained a photo of Jean Chrétien (prime minister of Canada) and Ujjal Dosanjh (the new premier of British Columbia) unveiling a plaque commemorating the declaration. The headline of the accompanying article read: "Clayoquot Sound UN Dedication Ends Timber Battle." The article announced that "the designation marks an end to the so-called War in the Woods that flared in the summer of 1993 when more than 800 protesters were arrested in demonstrations against the two main logging companies in the area" (*Globe and Mail*, May 6, 2000, A2). Although it noted that the ceremony was boycotted by the Tla-o-qui-aht in protest of stalled treaty negotiations, and that "politicians and environmentalists concede that conflicts still plague the region," the overall tone was one of relieved celebration: the conflicts over the fate of Clayoquot Sound were essentially resolved. Or so we are supposed to believe.

One way of reading the ceremony is as a symbolic affirmation of Canadian sovereignty. The prime minister and the premier try to show the world that they are still in control, and that the settlement at Clayoquot stems from their authority. Ironically, they can only do so by invoking the authority of the United Nations. Moreover, those close to the situation would argue that the authority underpinning the apparent settlement does not belong to the Canadian state, but rather to the First Nations, the environmentalists, the Canadian division of Weyerhauser (the huge American logging company), and local communities. Weyerhauser had bought out
MacMillan Bloedel, the corporate icon of BC forestry, just after the latter company—the one that was blockaded in 1993, and that was always at the center of the disputes in Clayoquot—joined five major environmental groups and the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council in a memorandum of understanding that was to govern future logging operations in the region. That memorandum of understanding, signed on June 16, 1999, was what gave substance to the Biosphere Reserve. Without it, the Reserve would not have been possible. Although neither the provincial nor the federal government had had much to do with the memorandum of understanding, they had promoted the Biosphere Reserve. That gave the premier and the prime minister the cover necessary for taking credit for “peace in the woods.”

It is obvious why the governments concerned would want to associate themselves with the apparent settlement. Less obvious is why the non-governmental actors—so much at odds a few years earlier—could have come to an agreement. Had anything really been settled? And if not, why did the parties enter into an understanding that was so widely hailed as a settlement? Let’s consider the second question first. The memorandum of understanding was the result of negotiations between environmental groups, the Nuu-chah-nulth, and MacMillan Bloedel. To understand how these negotiations could have succeeded, when so many earlier attempts failed, we need to consider the changing circumstances of each of the major actors.

The environmentalists were motivated by both their successes and their failures. The campaign in Clayoquot had ultimately been a “success” in that MacMillan Bloedel had wound down its operations in the Sound after 1993, and stopped logging there altogether in 1997. The company insisted, however, that the halt to logging was only temporary. Moreover, it continued its operations elsewhere in the province, in places that the environmentalists had more difficulty protecting. By making Clayoquot their “poster child,” the environmentalists realized that they might only have transferred the basic problem of excessive and damaging clearcut logging to other parts of British Columbia. The problem that had brought them to the barricades had been addressed only superficially, as a conflict over the future of a particular area, rather than structurally, as a contest over the future of forestry in British Columbia. Would ecologically sustainable forestry become general, or would just a few “special” areas be saved from clearcut logging?

Environmental groups responded to their dilemma by linking their various campaigns with one another (using Clayoquot as a linchpin) and by
intensifying their efforts to bring pressure on logging companies to develop more ecologically sustainable harvesting methods by politicizing their foreign markets, especially in the United States and Europe. This shift was expressed in the development of the Coastal Rainforest Coalition (http://www.coastalrainforest.org), composed of Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network, and Natural Resources Defense Council. Initially formed in 1994 to focus and coordinate the groups’ campaigns in Clayoquot, the coalition later expanded its focus to temperate rainforests all along the coast of British Columbia.

Initial efforts to expand the geographic scope of the campaign were not entirely successful. In the summer of 1997, Greenpeace initiated a direct-action campaign in the sparsely populated mid-coast region on the mainland of British Columbia (which they dubbed the “Great Bear Rainforest”), hoping it would snowball and attract people as the campaigns at Clayoquot had. Instead, it encountered significant resistance, initially from forestry workers, rapidly spreading to some local First Nations leaders, and eventually to the provincial premier, Glen Clark, who tagged Greenpeace supporters “enemies of British Columbia.” Rather than snowballing, the campaign struggled against intense criticism. The region was more remote and inaccessible than Clayoquot, and few people were willing to put their bodies on the line on its behalf. Without a local community to support the action, and in the face of widespread criticism, the environmentalists realized that the logistics of sustaining a direct-action campaign on the mid-coast were overwhelming. More important, they realized that public opinion in British Columbia was not yet sufficiently in favor of structural changes in the forestry industry to sustain their campaign. This drove home the extent to which public support of Clayoquot Sound was based in large part on its “special” status, and on trying to protect that region specifically, rather than on a broader commitment to restructuring the forest industry. Trying to achieve “special” status for the mid-coast region was going to be a limited, if necessary, tactic.

Rather than abandon direct-action strategies, or the tactic of creating name-recognition status for the “Great Bear Rainforest,” the environmental groups shifted their attention to creating this status through direct-action campaigns elsewhere, particularly in England, Germany, and later the United States. In this way, the direct-action campaign became increasingly closely linked with the markets campaign—in the long run, a more effective strategy. This strategy was twofold: mobilize consumer interest in the region enough to raise the specter of a consumer boycott of any company that
purchased products from corporations that logged in the Great Bear Rainforest, then use this specter to encourage companies to cancel contracts with corporations that logged there and to purchase instead from companies that harvested in an ecologically sustainable manner and, preferably, not in old-growth rainforest. The environmental groups could thus simultaneously seek to protect regions of the Great Bear Rainforest and push companies toward more sustainable harvesting methods. Refusals to purchase products from the Great Bear Rainforest mounted. By December 1998, twenty-seven major companies, including Xerox, FedEx, Kinko’s, 3M, and Bristol-Myers-Squibb, had committed to only purchasing sustainably harvested wood products.

By December 1999, Time magazine called efforts to save the Great Bear Rainforest the best environmental news of the year. Although the region was still unprotected, Time was impressed with the progress made toward convincing companies not to buy wood that was from endangered forest types or was not sustainably harvested. In March 2000, environmentalists and logging companies signed a truce modeled on the memorandum of understanding at Clayoquot (Hamilton 2000). Environmentalists seemed to have achieved the upper hand. As Linda Coady, vice president of environmental enterprises for Weyerhaeuser’s Coastal Group and chairwoman of the negotiating committee for logging companies involved in the midcoast region, put it: “If we do not respond to these challenges, continued targeting of BC forest products in the international marketplace will lead to job loss, falling revenues for companies and government alike, community instability and lost opportunities for First Nations” (Lee 2000). The truce, in turn, led, on April 4, 2001, to a new agreement to protect the region, this one negotiated among environmentalists, First Nations, logging companies, unions, and coastal communities and, eventually, recognized by the provincial government. This agreement protected forty-two untouched rainforest valleys, and deferred logging in another seventy-seven valleys pending studies by a scientific panel on the model of the Scientific Panel for Clayoquot Sound. The agreement will cost five hundred jobs, but the government has committed some money for short-term mitigation. Most important, any logging done in the future will be ecosystem-based, with First Nations in control of it. The tactics developed through the Clayoquot struggles seemed to have paid off (Gill 2001).

In late 1997, the situation had looked rather different to environmentalists, who had suffered enough setbacks in the Great Bear Rainforest to give them pause. In order to capitalize on their early successes in the markets campaign, they needed to show a willingness to work with businesses
to develop more sustainable harvesting practices. They needed to help show a way forward so that they did not become marginalized as preservationists with no concern for the economic and environmental well-being of the province. This danger was reflected in their sensitivity to opposition by First Nations leaders. Without the support of the indigenous peoples who claimed the land the environmentalists were defending, environmental groups were likely to encounter rocky ground both provincially and internationally. Having succeeded in getting the issues into the public eye, they now needed to start delivering solutions—or at least progress—in order to sustain and expand their campaigns. Their very strength and successes were forcing them into a less oppositional stance.

For forestry companies, the early successes of the environmentalist markets campaign posed a serious challenge. Despite the companies' efforts to simultaneously loosen provincial forestry regulations and hold them up as sufficient, they were going to be held to a higher standard of operation by the politics of the international marketplace. This was not, however, their only concern. By 1997, a long-predicted crisis in the BC forestry industry had begun to take hold (Marchak 1983, 1995; Drushka, Nixon, and Travers 1993; M'Gonigle and Parfitt 1994; Barnes and Hayter 1997; Tollefson 1998; Marchak, Aylcock, and Herbert 1999). The forest industry was facing a significant downturn. After years of high profits, MacMillan Bloedel recorded losses in 1997 of more than $350 million. The year 1998 was terrible for the industry, with job cuts, plummeting sales, and a number of mill closures; total industry losses for the year were more than $1.1 billion. In this climate, the challenges posed by environmentalists and, increasingly, by First Nations' land claims, which were gathering legal support, were even more potentially damaging to logging companies. With an eye to this emerging crisis, MacMillan Bloedel hired a new CEO, an American restructuring expert named Tom Stephens, and gave him the task of turning around the company's fortunes. His measures included trimming jobs, selling off parts of the company's diverse business interests, and introducing a co-management system that gave unionized employees a say in how the company was run. He saw achieving peace with environmentalists as necessary for a turnaround. To this end, he met with environmentalists and announced that, over a five-year period, MacMillan Bloedel would shift from clearcut to variable-retention logging in old-growth forests. Environmental organizations responded with cautious approval.25

In 1997, MacMillan Bloedel wound down its operations in Clayoquot, citing the need to restructure to accommodate recommendations of the Scientific Panel. It worked out an arrangement to create a joint-venture company with the Nuu-chah-nulth, who were keen to pursue economic
development opportunities but needed not only infrastructural and institutional support, but also access to the Tree Farm Licence owned by MacMillan Bloedel if they wished to get into the logging business. Thus MacMillan Bloedel and Ma-Mook Development Corporation (a Nuu-chah-nulth-owned economic development corporation) formed Issak Forest Resources Company, a joint-venture logging corporation, 51 percent owned by Ma-Mook and 49 percent by MacMillan Bloedel. Pending provincial approval, MacMillan Bloedel promised to hand over the Clayoquot portion of its Tree Farm Licence to the new corporation. In this way, MacMillan Bloedel kept one foot in Clayoquot Sound, which had by this point become much more important to it as a public-relations tool (in relation both to the European markets campaign and to BC’s First Nations, who would presumably be controlling some of the future logging opportunities in the province) and as a potential site for developing alternative forestry methods, rather than as a profit-making enterprise. Instead of being the source of stinging attacks, Clayoquot now promised to be a site that could be pointed to as the pioneer of the future of forestry in British Columbia.

Thus, under environmentalist pressure and broader economic pressures, MacMillan Bloedel needed to make peace with environmentalists, and Clayoquot was the place to begin. The most obvious sign of its success is that twenty-four hours after the MOU was signed, MacMillan Bloedel announced that it was being bought by Weyerhauser in a deal that was very profitable for its shareholders.

As the post-1993 developments—the Interim Measures Agreement, the Scientific Panel, and the opening up of treaty talks—suggested, the Nuu-chah-nulth had become central to negotiations over the future of Clayoquot. Their situation was further strengthened by provincial-level legal developments. In 1996, the Agreement-in-Principle was signed for the Nisga’a treaty, which would become the first modern treaty, indicating a potentially positive outcome for the restarted treaty talks. In 1997, as Umee Ahousaat (E. Richard Atleo) discusses in his essay in this volume, the Supreme Court of Canada made its decision on the Delgamuukw appeal, a decision that recognized that “aboriginal title” had legal standing. These events indicated the gradual strengthening of the legal situation of First Nations in British Columbia. The challenge faced by individual Nations, including the Nuu-chah-nulth, was how to convert this into desperately needed economic and institutional strength. For this, the Nuu-chah-nulth needed both MacMillan Bloedel and environmental groups. MacMillan Bloedel held title to the Tree Farm Licence for much of Clayoquot Sound, which meant that it had control over the most lucrative industry for the Nuu-chah-
nullth: logging. It also, of course, had the necessary equipment and expertise. The last thing the Nuu-chah-nulth wanted, however, was to be dependent on MacMillan Bloedel. Rather, they sought to develop their own capacities for economic development. For this, the environmentalists were crucial, as they offered a counterbalance to MacMillan Bloedel's strength: their work had opened up the possibility and incentive for a different kind of logging, one that would be more sustainable, more easily managed by a relatively small group such as the Nuu-chah-nulth, but still viable as an economic venture. By drawing on both the environmentalists and MacMillan Bloedel, the Nuu-chah-nulth could potentially create space to articulate their own vision of the future for Clayoquot Sound, one that included logging as part of their economic base, but at a pace and in a way that were compatible with the Nuu-chah-nulth and somewhat under their control. With the help of environmentalists, the Nuu-chah-nulth also hoped to pursue alternative economic development mechanisms. In this way, MacMillan Bloedel and environmental groups together provided an important opportunity for the Nuu-chah-nulth: by balancing their expertise and resources, the Nuu-chah-nulth could potentially access each of their strengths without fearing that one side or the other would gain too much control over their activities. It was a fine line, but in many ways it offered rich possibilities.

Given these developments, achieving peace at Clayoquot seemed increasingly possible. Environmentalists needed to sustain legitimacy against claims that their preservationist ethic was reinscribing colonial relations with indigenous peoples and turning British Columbia into an economic disaster; MacMillan Bloedel needed to sustain marketplace profile, particularly by claiming to be moving toward eco-friendly forestry; the Nuu-chah-nulth needed to develop economic independence. The dynamics were bigger than Clayoquot, but Clayoquot was the site where they were being operationalized.

The memorandum of understanding came out of this situation. The MOU is an agreement between Isaaak Forest Resources, the MacMillan Bloedel/Nuu-chah-nulth joint-venture forestry company, and five environmental groups (Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Canada, Western Canada Wilderness Committee, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Rainforest Action Network). One environmental organization, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, participated in the negotiations around the MOU but abstained from signing it. Although it supported the decision of the other groups to sign the agreement, it felt that its role should be that of watchdog, and that it could better fulfill that role by not signing. The MOU sets out the conditions for ongoing cooperation among the signatories. It commits
Lisaak to operate according to the spirit, principles, and recommendations of the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, with special attention to a range of concerns (biodiversity, water quality, etc.) and potential uses of the land (scientific research, ecotourism, traditional Nuu-chah-nulth uses, etc.). It also targets areas already impacted by logging as sites for ecologically sustainable commercial forestry, and spares pristine watersheds from logging. These areas are instead reserved for other uses, such as traditional cultural uses, sustainable harvesting of nontimber forest products, and ecotourism. Where logging does occur, the emphasis will be on production of ecologically sustainable volumes of wood, and priority will be placed on maintaining old-growth forest characteristics within harvest areas and nurturing second-growth stands into forests with old-growth characteristics.

If Lisaak sustains its commitments in these areas, the MOU commits environmental groups to support and endorse Lisaak as a model of ecologically sustainable forestry, to assist its institutional development (including research, financing, and capacity-building endeavors) and to actively assist it in developing and marketing its products, whether value-added forestry products, nontimber forest products, or ecotourism products. The MOU thus commits significant energy from environmental groups in directions that might seem out of character: raising funds for, assisting in, and promoting the products from logging in old-growth forests. This marks an important shift in both the self-understanding and the public face of some of these environmental organizations.

Although it is not legally binding, the MOU sets out rigorous conditions for cooperation among the parties. It also contains a compelling vision for the future of Clayoquot Sound: pristine areas will be protected from industrial forestry, but used to support the economic health of the region in other ways; a viable, locally controlled ecoforestry operation will produce value-added products and provide an economic base for local First Nations, and there will be a gradual diversification of the economy into nontimber resources. As a broadly agreed vision of the future of the region, it is striking, especially given the extent of past conflicts. However, as all parties to the MOU emphasized, it will not be easy to achieve. Still, there was much celebration upon its signing. Some commentators noted that women had played an important role in the agreement (Bossin 1999). Linda Coady, who had been brought in to feminize MacMillan Bloedel’s image (as Nancy Scott had recommended ten years earlier [CD II/C/2]), was the chief negotiator for the logging companies, and her environmentalist counterparts were all women. Only the First Nations had male spokespeople. Thus, the process
itself, as well as the ultimate agreement, appeared to have been empowering for more than one marginalized group, and this empowerment had had a positive effect on the outcome.

Although not officially connected, the achievement of the MOU facilitated negotiations over the possibility of proposing Clayoquot Sound as a United Nations Biosphere Reserve. The suggestion to propose Clayoquot Sound as Biosphere Reserve had been made in 1991 by the Clayoquot Biosphere Project, and in 1993 by Stephen Owen in the CORE response to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. Negotiations on the proposal did not get under way, however, until much later, when it was raised again in the context of the Central Region Board. Unlike the MOU, these negotiations were conducted openly; one condition for a Biosphere Reserve designation is that the application have virtually unanimous support from the region. Achieving this level of agreement over the future of Clayoquot posed a significant challenge, given the history of conflict in the region.

The process proceeded slowly, with public workshops and consultations, including both public input and individuals or groups meeting privately with the coordinator of the Biosphere Reserve Nomination Working Group. The minutes of workshops, discussion papers, and government pamphlets promoting the idea were widely circulated, and a consensus slowly developed that the proposal was a good idea. Achievement of this consensus was facilitated by the fact that the designation actually changes very little: it does not transfer jurisdiction over land use to any body outside the region; it does not confer protection on any new parts of the region; in fact, it does not guarantee much of anything. It is effectively a recognition of land use and jurisdictional arrangements already in place. As an information sheet distributed by the Biosphere Reserve Nomination Working Group put it: "Biosphere Reserves are land or marine areas which are given international recognition within UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Programme for promoting and demonstrating a balanced relationship between people and nature." ("The Clayoquot Sound UNESCO Biosphere Reserve: Proposed Context, Vision and Objectives," July 22, 1998). Thus, in early discussions, much energy was spent convincing the parties that the designation would not prejudice treaty negotiations, prohibit logging, or enable foreign organizations (such as the United Nations) to dictate policy in the region:

A Biosphere Reserve Designation for Clayoquot Sound will not add more bureaucracy, will not result in a new set of criteria related to resource management, and will not mean that external agencies
will dictate resource management within the area. This designation will, however, recognize important work on land and resource management that is already underway in Clayoquot Sound.

(Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board information sheet: www.island.net/~crb/RESERVE.html)

Evidently, the symbolism of the declaration was important to many of the participants. As the Central Region Board put it:

The Central Region Board's interest in potential Biosphere Reserve status is based on its desire to raise the international profile of Clayoquot Sound, to promote innovations in sustainable ecosystem-based resource management and institutional frameworks, to integrate planning for marine and terrestrial ecosystems, and to use Biosphere designation as a tool for seeking funds to assist with economic diversification and transition. (Ibid.)

This latter possibility became the real carrot for negotiators. Once both federal and provincial governments began to hint at the possibility of contributing significant financial resources if the designation went through, some who had been resistant or lukewarm began to warm to the idea of a Biosphere Reserve designation (O'Neil 1996; Sinoski 1999). By January 1999 (when some of the details of the MOU were still at issue), there was enough consensus to put the nomination forward to the United Nations. A little over a year later, the premier and the prime minister were able to come for the ceremonies that marked the inauguration of the reserve. Those ceremonies were intended not only to demonstrate the authority of the governments, but also to affirm that all the interested groups—not just the signatories to the MOU—were parties to the settlement at Clayoquot.

In that light, the Tla-o-qui-aht boycott of the ceremony was more than a little troubling. The issue of “native land claims” had not been settled in Clayoquot or elsewhere in the province. In fact, the issue has become more heated since the agreement in principle for the Nisga’a treaty was signed in 1996 and the Supreme Court’s final Delgamuukw decision came down in December 1997. The Nisga’a agreement was opposed by the main opposition parties federally and provincially. It went into effect in May 2000, but it is still subject to a constitutional challenge supported by the provincial Liberals, who won a massive majority in 2001 and now form the provincial government. Despite all the talk about new treaties between Canada/British Columbia and the First Nations, the one for the Nisga’a is the sole treaty to have been concluded after nine years of negotiations in the province (and that was under the older process, not the new one launched with
much fanfare by the BC Treaty Commission). A second treaty, for the Sechelt (a band whose lands are on the south coast of the mainland, just north of the city of Vancouver), seemed to be in the works at one point: an agreement in principle was reached in 1999. However, that agreement fell apart because of internal opposition: the Sechelt band is now set to take its case to court. Although the Nuu-chah-nulth themselves are still in treaty negotiations, they may well decide to follow the example of other First Nations, and pursue their case through the courts. Such a move may be inevitable, because the provincial Liberals are not likely to negotiate with the Nuu-chah-nulth on terms that the Nuu-chah-nulth would find acceptable.

The village councils in Tofino and Ucluelet were less than enthusiastic about the MOU. This reflects ongoing resentment against "outsiders" (environmentalists, logging company executives, government bureaucrats, First Nations leaders), who seem to be working out the future of the region over the heads or behind the backs of the "local communities." Of course, "local community" is a code word that disguises many exclusions; nevertheless, there is widespread popular feeling behind this term. When news leaked out that a tentative agreement had been reached between environmentalists, Natives, and some of the logging companies in relation to the Great Bear Rainforest, local leaders in that region reacted with outrage. The provincial government was also put out. They did not want to be left out of another MOU and have a settlement like the one at Clayoquot foisted on them. Given the desperate situation of the fishing industry in coastal British Columbia and the scant opportunities for tourism development in many places—not least because Clayoquot and a few other places have a comparative advantage in terms of name recognition, accessibility, and tourist facilities—the loss of opportunities in forestry is an extremely serious matter for small coastal communities.31

It is not as if the environmentalists have "won" in Clayoquot or elsewhere. Interfor, the second-largest logging company in Clayoquot (and a major player in the Great Bear Rainforest), remains active, and there have been continuing protests about its logging activities on the fringes of Pacific Rim National Park. Environmentalists have been gearing up to prevent Interfor from going into the "pristine" areas in Clayoquot, where it still has some logging rights. There is no guarantee that Interfor will stop logging or sell its interests in Clayoquot Sound to lisak, although the Great Bear Rainforest agreement contains a commitment from it to consider doing so. Thus, old-style clearcut logging is still very much an issue in Clayoquot, as elsewhere in British Columbia. Even the prospective agreements between the environmentalists, the First Nations, and the logging companies are extremely
fragile, in that they are keyed into a regulatory regime that is susceptible, on the one hand, to corporate manipulation and, on the other, to the vagaries of consumer preference. Will there be steady consumer support for better logging practices in Germany and the United States? Will the environmentalists be able to monitor those practices effectively enough (and publicize their findings in face of corporate advertising campaigns) to keep the logging companies honest? Old-growth trees continue to fall at a high rate, if not in Clayoquot, then elsewhere in British Columbia, as well as throughout the world.

Locally, the settlement tends to obscure what has been happening in and around Clayoquot Sound. The shift to tourism and retirement living has been pronounced, and has accelerated since 1993. Traditional logging and fishing are becoming less and less important within the local economy. More and more people are making their living by serving “outsiders” who come for leisure activities. Is this what a “biosphere reserve” actually means? If so—as the essays by Sandilands and Luke suggest—the future for Clayoquot is not quite as rosy as some might imagine.

The disputes at Clayoquot were never simply about logging, or indeed about the environment, and could not be resolved by an agreement about logging or environmental preservation. Much else has always been at issue, including democratic process, local autonomy, dispute resolution, the nature and use of the law, the organization and purpose of economic activity, gender identity and gender equality, and relations between Natives and non-Natives. In many instances, underlying issues have been largely ignored. Problems of poverty and social exclusion have a particular impact on First Nations communities, which have long suffered the effects of colonialism. Domestic violence against women is an issue everywhere, including in places such as Clayoquot, where established ways of life have been seriously disrupted. The marginalization of people who are remote from the centers of urban authority intensifies alienation and resentment. Most of the benefits of restructuring go to the few, and many of the few come from away. Capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy are still entrenched, and the human relation to the biosphere is still exploitative and irresponsible. Clayoquot remains deeply problematic. Its politics, however—both past and present—have much to teach us about strategies and structures through which these relationships are being reshaped.

Notes

2. The land at issue was and is public, as are most forested lands in British Columbia. However, logging companies had been granted Tree Farm Licences (TFLs)—in effect, timber rights—in the areas at issue. See the Introduction, note 4 for references on the BC forest industry.

3. The controversy had generated an influential picture book (George and Dorst 1985). A later book (Dorst and Young 1990) of this sort deals with the Sound as a whole. As I was to discover, controversies over logging have led to a series of such books, each publicizing the issues in a particular area: the Queen Charlotte Islands (Islands Protection Society 1984), the Stein Valley (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988), the Carmanah Valley (Dorst and Young 1990), and, most recently, the mid-coast, or “Great Bear Rainforest” (McAllister, Young, and McAllister 1997).

4. See the Research Guide at the end of this volume for an explanation of CD [Clayoquot Documents] referencing system.

5. The CD references here are examples of these debates, but they extend throughout the material collected in The Clayoquot Documents.

6. As was the case in other Commonwealth countries, for much of the twentieth century indigenous children across Canada were—often forcibly—removed from their homes and families and placed in residential schools, usually run by religious organizations. This practice was devastating to Native communities, who continue to struggle with its effects. See Miller (1996), Fournier and Grey (1997), Chrisjohn and Young (1997), and Milloy (1999). There were two residential schools in Clayoquot Sound.

7. What in the United States is called a “reservation” is called a “reserve” in Canada. A reserve is often very small, and the reserve lands belonging to a particular band are not necessarily contiguous.

8. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS) is a small, grassroots environmental organization that was formed when Meares Island—at the heart of Clayoquot Sound—was threatened with clearcut logging. They were the guiding force for the struggle against clearcut logging in the Sound during the period covered in this book. For a description of the origin of the organization, see CD II/A/2. For more information on its current activities, see FOCS at www.ancientrainforest.org.

9. Clayoquot is the Anglicized spelling of Tla-o-qui-aht, which is how the band now refers to itself.

10. The key decisions are noted on the Web site of the BC Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs: www.aaf.gov.bc.ca/aaf/history/history.htm. There are links to most of these decisions, which may be read on-line.

11. In 1965, the province of British Columbia divided itself into “Regional Districts” (http://www.march.gov.bc.ca/LGPO/LGPO/content.html). A Regional District is akin to an American county in that it provides for a variety of local services at a level above the local municipality. Because much of British Columbia is sparsely populated, there are no municipal governments in many areas. Port Alberni, Ucluelet, and Tofino are the only municipalities within the Alberni-Cayoquot Regional District. The rest of the territory is unincorporated, and to the extent that municipal services are provided, the Regional District takes direct responsibility for them. The Indian reserves are not within the Regional District’s jurisdiction. Services may be provided by contract, however. See Bish (1999), for an account of BC local government.
12. Originally the International Woodworkers of America, now called the Industrial, Wood and Allied Workers of Canada. For many years, the IWA was the biggest and most powerful union in British Columbia. See its Web site (www.iwa.ca/).

13. The Forest Alliance assumed responsibilities that had earlier been handled by the Council of Forest Industries: www.cofi.org/ (Wilson 1998, 37).

14. See www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/data/bus_stat/tourism/rrr_an97.pdf for information on the growth of tourism in the region. Also see the Web sites of the Tofino–Long Beach Chamber of Commerce (www.island.net/~tofino/) and the Pacific Rim Tourist Association (www.alberni.net/~pacrimtourist/).

15. The ombudsman is an independent official who reports to the provincial legislature rather than to the cabinet and is empowered to inquire into, and report on, cases of administrative injustice.

16. The key agency now is the BC Treaty Commission, whose Web site is at www.bctreaty.net/.

17. For the protesters’ own accounts, see Berman et al. 1994; MacIsaac and Champagne 1994; and McLaren 1994.

18. Maclean’s describes itself as “Canada’s National News Magazine.” At the time, the Globe and Mail was Canada’s only national newspaper.

19. In Canada, the prosecuting attorney is called “the Crown” or Crown Attorney. One also speaks of Crown lands, Crown corporations, rights of the Crown, and Crown prerogative. Sovereignty inheres in the Crown rather than in the people, and all acts of the state are done in the name of the Crown. Most of the land in British Columbia belongs to “the Crown in right of British Columbia,” that is, to the province.


21. For the government’s views, see the Web site of the British Columbia Commissioner for Aquaculture Development at www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/acad-bcda/. Industry accounts are available from the BC Salmon Farmers’ Association (www.salmonfarmers.org/) and the BC Shellfish Growers’ Association (www.island.net/~bcaga/). Critiques of the industry are on the Web sites of many of the environmental organizations. For the Nuu-chah-nulth view, see www.nuu-chah-nulth.org.

22. For news coverage of these activities, see Hunter 1997; Hume 1997; Pynn 1997; Molland 1997; MacQueen 1997.


25. Clearcutting involves the removal of all trees within a harvest area. In variable-retention logging, small patches of forest cover are left undisturbed within a harvest area. See Rainforest Action Network’s press release on the issue at www.ran.org/ran/info_center/press_release/bloedel.html.

26. As suggested earlier, the deal at Clayoquot would become a template for MacMillan Bloedel’s negotiations in the Great Bear Rainforest.

27. The FOCS has fulfilled this role effectively. In 1998, for example, it re-
leased a report titled “Implementing the Scientific Panel: Three Years and Counting.” Grounded in research from its Forest Watch program, the report developed a detailed critique of the Scientific Panel and the Forest Practices Code, as well as analyzing the implementation of the Scientific Panel’s recommendations in Clayoquot Sound (the only systematic evaluation to date). The report focused on the implementation of the Panel’s provisions for community involvement, adherence to inventory and monitoring provisions, the creation of an adaptive management strategy, and its potential for ecosystem-based logging. It argued that application of the Scientific Panel’s recommendations had been woefully inadequate and offered its own suggestions. The report is reproduced on our Web site in volume 3 of The Clayoquot Documents.

28. The memorandum of understanding is reproduced in full on our Web site in volume 3 of The Clayoquot Documents.

29. Although MacMillan Bloedel hold the largest TFL in Clayoquot Sound (now transferred to Islaak), another company—International Forest Products (Interfor)—holds the rest and has been resistant to negotiating any similar deal with environmentalists, and continues to pursue industrial-style logging in the region. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound have blockaded the company on several recent occasions.

30. Many of these documents are available on our Web site in volume 3 of The Clayoquot Documents.

31. See the Web site of the Coastal Communities Network at www.coastalcommunity.bc.ca/.

Works Cited


