Provides a
critical overview of
neutral theory in
community ecology, and
discusses how it should
(and should not) be
applied to communities of
genetic elements. We also
compare this application
of genome-level neutral
theory to other models of
neutral evolution, in
particular to Kimura's
Neutral theory and Lynch's
Mutational Hazard Model.
Identifies some
key questions in
transposon biology
that are potentially
illuminated by an
ecological approach.
Then offers a general
distinction between
ecology and evolution,
which can be used to
measure the extent to
which a given pattern
calls for each type of
explanation. This
distinction could in
principle be applied
at any level in
biology (populations,
communities,
ecosystems, etc). We
apply it here at the
genomic level.
Applies some of
the thinking outlined
in the former
theoretical paper.
Specifically, we
conducted a transect
analysis of
transposable elements
to assess whether
"ecological" factors
(within the genome)
impact the spatial
distribution of
particular transposon
families.
By applying the
distinction between
evolution and ecology,
developed by Linquist et
al. (2013) to ecological
communities, it becomes
apparent that Lawton's
Contingency Thesis --that
ecological communities
admit of no general "laws"
--is based on the wrong
kind of evidence.
Argues that general
ecological theories,
such as Island
Biogeography Theory, are
equally (if not better)
suited to conservation
management than place
prioritization
algorithms.
Argues that the
methods used by ENCODE to
assign biochemical
functions to genetic
elements were
illegitimate, not simply
because they employed a CR
as opposed to an SE
concept, but because most
of the elements that they
investigated are (or once
were) mobile --i.e.
tranposons. We
provide a superior
framework for determining
when a mobile element can
be legitimately viewed as
functional.
Argues that
geneticists should be more
explicit in distinguishing
CR and SE functions, and
that a large portion of
the effects that they
currently identify as
"functional" are
more accurately described
as mere effects -i.e. non
functional.
emotion,
culture and
neuroscience
Linquist, S. &
J. Bartol (2013). Two
myths about somatic
markers. The
British Journal for
the Philosophy of
Science. 64(3):
455-484.
Provides a
framework for classifying
alternative versions of
the (highly ambiguous)
Somatic Marker Hypothesis.
Then argues that chief
proponents of SMH have
favoured interpretations
wherein somatic markers
influence the core stages
of decision making, when
in fact their own evidence
suggests a role in
peripheral stages.
Demonstrates
that the scientific
literature is replete with
competing interpretations
of the Somatic marker
Hypothesis. And provides a
basic computational model
of decision making to help
systematize these
alternative
interpretations.
innateness and human
nature Linquist, S. E.
Machery, P. Griffiths
& K. Stotz (2011). Exploring
the folkbiological
conception of innateness.
Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society B
vol. 366, issue
1563: 444-454.
Provides further
empirical evidence for the
Three Factor theory of the
innateness concept. Also
shows that judgments about
traits being "in the
genes" have the same
structure. Argues that a
multi-dimensional analysis
of concepts is preferable
because of the
fine-grained analysis.
Introduces the
Three Factor theory of the
innatenes concept, where
evidence of fixity,
species typicality or
adaption are individually
sufficient for the folk to
judge that a trait is
"innate." Provides
empirical evidence that
the three factors are also
additive.
Linquist,
S. (2007) "If
it feels good, believe
it. Paul Thagard's Hot
Thought: Mechanisms and
Applications of
Emotional Cognition",
Notre Dame
Philosophical Review.
Linquist,
S. (2006) "When
is an Orgasm just an
Orgasm? Elizabeth
Lloyd's The
Case of the Female
Orgasm: Bias in the
Science of Evolution",
Metascience, 15:411-419.
